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Abstract
The increased salience in the 1990s of immigration politics in the European Union has been 
accompanied by a rise of the scholarly attention for this topic. What most studies leave aside, 
however, is the question of how European integration impacts on national immigration policies. 
This paper differentiates between types of European integration and presents empirical evidence 
from the case of the Netherlands. It analyzes to what extent and how issues related to free 
movement, asylum and citizenship are affected substantively by European integration. The paper 
concludes that how Europe impacts on domestic politics depends on the question of why Europe 
should be involved at all. 
Kurzfassung
Das vermehrte Aufkommen von Einwanderungspolitik in der Europäischen Union in den 1990ern 
war von einer gesteigerten Aufmerksamkeit der Wissenschaft für dieses Thema begleitet. Was 
jedoch die meisten Studien beiseite lassen, ist die Frage, wie die Europäische Integration nationale 
Einwanderungspolitik beeinflusst. Dieses Papier differenziert zwischen den Typen der 
Europäischen Integration und präsentiert empirische Nachweise anhand des Falls der Niederlande. 
Es analysiert, in welchem Ausmaß und inwiefern Zusammenhänge zum freien Personenverkehr, 
Asyl und Bürgerrechte durch die Europäische Integration substanziell bestimmt werden. Das 
Papier kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Frage, wie sehr Europa auf nationale Politik zurückwirkt, 
davon abhängig ist, warum Europa überhaupt miteinbezogen werden soll. 
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1 Introduction   
The concept of Europeanization enjoys increasing popularity within the study of European 
integration. Although there is a quite some conceptual contestation with regard to the question what 
Europeanization actually is, the bulk of the literature speaks of Europeanization when something in 
the domestic political system is affected by something European.(1) Hence Europeanization can 
most generally be defined as the impact of European integration at the national level (cf. Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, 2002: 255). Or, more precisely, as 'a process of change in national institutional and policy 
practices that can be attributed to European integration' (Hix and Goetz, 2000: 27).  
The increased salience in the 1990s of immigration politics in the European Union (EU) has been 
accompanied by a rise of the scholarly attention for this topic. Scholars from traditional disciplines 
such as political philosophy, sociology, comparative (legal) politics and international relations now 
form an ever more closely related group of academics studying the broad range of issues connected 
to immigration in the EU (cf. Vink, 2002). What most studies leave aside, however, is the question 
of how European integration impacts on national immigration policies. In other words, the question 
of Europeanization is yet to be studied to its full extent in this field (but see, e.g. Checkel, 2001; 
Lavenex, 2001; Vink, 2001).  
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and hesitant developments at the European level, a central task of this paper is to construct a 
typology of European integration covering the range of immigration issues (potentially) subject to 
Europeanization. Although the field of immigration obviously has some distinctive characteristics – 
foremost that it is strongly linked to national identity and the boundaries of the nation-state – I 
contend that there is no reason why here, prima face, the dynamics of Europeanization should be 
different from other fields such as competition or environmental policy. Hence, in order to explain 
why some domestic issues, such as free movement of persons, have been impacted more strongly by 
European integration than others, such as asylum or citizenship, I employ a general typology that 
should be applicable to other fields as well.  
Empirically, this paper assesses the extent and direction of change in domestic immigration policies 
under pressure from Europe, on the basis of findings from the Netherlands. In order to pin down the 
broader issue of immigration to some concrete aspects of domestic politics, I focus in particular on 
the issues of free movement of persons (the entry and residence of aliens), asylum (the protection of 
political and humanitarian refugees) and citizenship (the acquisition and loss of nationality). I look 
not only for technical adjustment to European requirements, but foremost for more substantive 
change in these core areas of national politics, and analyze some politically salient issues under 
scrutiny in Dutch parliament in the 1990s.  
I start this paper by outlining a general typology of European integration based on two dimensions of 
negative vs. positive integration and strong vs. weak integration. Then I hypothesize how in different 
ways European integration might be expected to affect domestic immigration policies. Section 4 
subsequently elaborates on some methodological issues. The second part of this paper then deals 
with free movement of persons, asylum and citizenship and presents some empirical evidence from 
the case of the Netherlands in the 1990s. I conclude by elaborating briefly on the more general 
implications of these (limited) manifestations of Europeanization for the study of European 
(immigration) politics.  
2
2 A Typology of European Integration   
Scholars of European integration increasingly employ the concept of Europeanization to assess the 
European sources of domestic politics. A new research agenda has evolved focusing on changes in 
national political systems that can be attributed to European integration (e.g. Ladrech 1994; Börzel 
1999; Mair 2000; Green Cowles et al 2001; Vink 2001; De Rooij, 2002; for more reflective 
contributions, see Hix and Goetz 2000; Radaelli 2000; Börzel and Risse 2000; Risse et al 2001; Knill 
and Lehmkuhl 2002).  
The concept of Europeanization has undoubtedly enriched the study of European integration by 
pointing out some previously under-researched questions, particularly related to the implementation 
of EU directives. However, approaching Europeanization exclusively from a 'top-down rather than 
bottom-up perspective' may in the end fail to recognize the more complex two-way causality of 
European integration (Börzel, 1999: 574; but see Börzel and Risse, 2000: 1; Börzel, 2002: 195). 
After all, even when EU policies can admittedly strongly affect domestic policies, these policies do 
not come out of the blue, but are the result – among others – of political action by domestic actors 
who shift domestic issues to the European level (cf. Putnam, 1988).  
In order to analyze the range of (immigration) policies that may or may not get Europeanized, we 
need to understand when and how national politics change under pressure from Europe. Hence a 
closer look is required at the dynamics of the European integration process. In this paper, drawing on 
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based on two basic dimensions of negative vs. positive integration and strong vs. weak integration.  
One of the basic distinctions in European integration theory is that between 'negative integration' and 
'positive integration', which points to the observation that European integration involves both 
market-making and market-correcting policies (Scharpf, 1996, 1999). Negative integration follows 
the rationale of the common market and has a deregulatory or 'market-making' nature (Scharpf, 
1996: 16-18; 1999: 50-71). By intervening against national barriers to the free movement of goods, 
persons, capital and services, negative integration greatly reduces the range of national policy 
choices and represents a fundamental loss of political control over the capitalist economy (Scharpf, 
1999: 70-71). This loss of national regulatory power is crucial in avoiding market-distorting state 
interventions, such as financial support for unprofitable national industry or discriminatory measures 
against foreign capital and labor. Negative integration demands that domestic regulations comply 
with Community law. It is generally quite effective in achieving liberalization in such fields as 
competition policy by removing tariffs and other barriers to trade, often in tandem with supranational 
agencies such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The 
Commission has important delegated powers, sends letters of warning to the member states for 
failure of compliance, and ultimately takes a case to the ECJ when obstruction of the internal market 
persists (Pollack, 1997). Individual or corporate litigants, possibly supported by public interest 
pressure groups, also play an important part in enforcing the common market. They are often at the 
basis of starting procedures by making a complaint to the Commission, or by starting legal 
procedures through national courts (Garett, 1992; Mattli and Slaughter, 1998: 186-206). The 
willingness of national courts to invoke Community law, or to refer cases to the ECJ for preliminary 
rulings under Article 234 (ex. 177) EC Treaty, is another factor contributing to Europeanization. The 
direct institutional impact of negative integration is however rather limited, in the sense that it does 
not so much specify how member state governments should run their country, but rather tells them 
what they cannot do.  
3
Positive integration, on the contrary, is an attempt to regain some power for the political vis-à-vis 
society and the market through re-regulation at the European level. The unwanted side-effects from 
liberalization processes, in particular from the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services, 
demand a certain level of re-regulation at the European level. Positive integration is hence 'market-
shaping' because it tries to intervene in the economy and involves a broader institutional adaptation 
at the domestic level to a specific European model (Scharpf, 1999: 45).(2) It takes place when 
European directives, regulations or soft instruments like the open method of coordination (OMC) 
prescribe or encourage a new institutional model at the domestic level to regulate in such areas as 
consumer protection, environmental policy, or safety at work. These different instruments may be 
expected, at least de jure, to have a wide-ranging impact on domestic politics. For example, the 
transposition of a directive in domestic legislation (Article 249 EC Treaty) requires different efforts 
from member states compared to ratification and implementation of a convention under the JHA 
pillar of the Treaty on European Union (Article 34 TEU). It is important to understand that positive 
integration is generally much less straightforward then negative integration, and the danger of 
inefficient policies due to unanimity decision-making ('joint-decision traps') is much more acute 
(Scharpf, 1988). Moreover, the domestic implementation of positive European policies requires a 
much more coordinated effort, depending of course on the extent to which there is a 'fit' or 'misfit' 
between European and domestic policies (Risse et al, 2001: 6-9).  
Figure I: A Typology of European Integration 
Negative   Positive  
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in areas where 'the underlying conflicts of interest between the Member States only allows it to adopt 
policies which are vague and more or less symbolic' (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 259; cf. Lavenex, 
2001). In my view, they rightfully point to the idea that Europeanization is not necessarily restricted 
to complying with EU regulations or transposing and implementing EU directives. Albeit surely less 
powerful, as Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002: 258) are keen to admit, Europeanization could proceed 
equally well through the framing of domestic beliefs and expectations. Europeanization then 
becomes manifest in transformed beliefs of domestic actors or in reconfigured domestic discourses. 
In contrast with Knill and Lehmkuhl, however, I would not denote this as a third distinct mechanism 
of Europeanization next to negative and positive integration, but rather view it as a second dimension 
of strong versus weak European policies. Their illustration of framing integration – European 
railways policies – is an excellent example of 'weak' negative integration that, it seems to me, can 
nonetheless have a significant impact (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 272-275; see also Risse, 1999). 
On the other hand, something like the non-binding Bologna Declaration on the European Space for 
Higher Education,(3) which seems to be an important inspiration for transformation of European 
higher education systems, could be a good example of 'weak' positive integration with a substantial 
domestic impact (cf. Trondal, 2002: 11-12).  
4
These two dimensions of positive vs. negative integration and strong vs. weak integration 
analytically lead to four different types of European integration (see Figure 1).(4) Before making a 
link to European immigration policies, the reader should note that, obviously, this is an analytical 
distinction and empirically we might see that the line between strong and weak integration is not a 
clear-cut one as it is often unclear to what extent European provisions truly provide a binding 
constraint on domestic policies. Also, most European policy fields are probably characterized by a 
mixture of negative and positive integration (cf. Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 257). The case of 
European immigration policies illustrates these mixed Europeanization dynamics. Focusing on the 
dominant patterns of both bottom-up and top-down processes of European integration should provide 
a better understanding of the range of Europeanization in that field.  
3 European Immigration Policies   
What are the dynamics of Europeanization in the field of immigration policy? Intuitively we would 
perhaps place immigration policy in the bottom- right corner of Figure 1, and indeed we will see that 
there are good reasons to treat immigration as a case of weak positive integration. Yet, as in most 
policy areas, the dynamics are more complex and in this section I introduce four policy areas related 
to immigration that can be linked to the four ideal types of European integration (see Figure 2). I also 
formulate some propositions on how these developments might be expected to affect domestic 
politics. Looking not only for the technical adjustment to European requirements, but also for 
substantive change at the domestic level, I phrase these propositions in terms of the impact on 
inclusion/exclusion dilemmas. What I do is analyze whether domestic immigration, asylum, 
(Deregulatory) (Regulatory)   
Strong  
(binding) 
e.g. Competition Policy  e.g. Environmental Policy  
Weak  
(non-binding) 
e.g. Railways Policy  e.g. Higher Education Policy
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experience a differential impact, due to European integration.  
Negative integration in the field of immigration policy is essentially driven by the free movement of 
persons, one of the Community's four fundamental freedoms. To realize the internal market, member 
states are prohibited to discriminate between their own citizens and Community nationals 'as regards 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment' (Article 39(2) EC Treaty). 
The area without internal frontiers ultimately entails the abolition of internal border control as such. 
Yet negative integration in practice is more about equal treatment and the abolition of functional 
borders, and free movement of persons is enforced by fighting against discriminatory domestic 
regulations. Since the 1960s this notion of equal treatment has been shaped by secondary 
Community legislation, gradually extending its scope from workers to citizens. Third-country 
nationals have mostly remained outside the scope of inclusive EC law (with the notable exception of 
citizens from associated countries), and generally do not profit from these anti-discriminatory 
measures. Europeanization might therefore be expected to bring about a somewhat differential 
impact on domestic policy, to the extent that Union citizens are treated more equally to national 
citizens, while third-country nationals remain (or even become more) excluded.  
Figure 2: Four Types of European Immigration Policies 
5
Asylum policy is a policy field where 'flanking measures' are necessary to correct unwanted side-
effects of negative integration, and thus a typical case of positive integration. Governments fear that 
certain categories of peoples, such as criminals and asylumseekers, could well profit from new 
liberties brought about by the free movement of persons and undermine national security, escape 
prosecution or exploit social welfare. Member states are therefore not willing to surrender their 
regulatory powers regarding the circulation of individuals, without re-regulation at the European 
level. Hence there are great pressures for positive integration, as Geddes (2000: 43) also notes: 'Free 
movement of persons chimes with the EU's fundamental market-making purposes, but has brought 
with it immigration and asylum policy cooperation and limited integration.' The most important 
Community instruments with regard to asylum policy are the 1990 Schengen and Dublin 
Conventions. Other instruments of the asylum acquis include two Council resolutions from 1992; 
one denoting applications from asylumseekers from 'safe countries of origin' as 'manifestly 
unfounded'; the other limiting the access to asylum procedures for applicants who traveled through 
'safe third countries' (Lavenex, 2001: 858-860). For obvious reasons, these policies may be expected 
to have an exclusionary impact in that territorial admission, access to procedures, as well as the 
possibility to be recognized as refugee are restricted for asylumseekers.  
Citizenship policy is a field par excellence where only weak European integration might be expected. 
Although states may feel the need to coordinate their policies in order to avoid some unwanted 
phenomena, such as multiple nationality and statelessness, the acquisition and loss of citizenship is 
Negative   Positive  
Strong Free Movement of Persons  
(e.g. equal treatment) 
Asylum Policy  
(e.g. minimum standards on reception and 
procedures)  
Weak  Union Citizenship  
(e.g. acquisition and loss of 
nationality) 
Minority Integration  
(e.g. dual nationality, anti-discrimination)  
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strong (negative or positive) EU citizenship policy because member states have always opposed any 
Community action in this respect and in the foreseeable future will remain doing so. Yet due to the 
spillover from the free movement of persons, a weak negative integration might be expected because 
– similar to the concept of 'worker' – the definition of who is a 'citizen' is crucial for the enjoyment of 
European rights. The Council of Europe (CE) in this regard exerts a more 'positive' pressure on 
domestic citizenship policies, albeit in a weak or indirect way (Checkel, 2001). The CE has dealt 
specifically with issues relating to citizenship since the 1960s, especially with a view to containing 
the (undesirable) phenomenon of dual nationality. More recently, however, the CE has taken a 
positive, or at least neutral, stance towards dual nationality. The norm has shifted towards trying to 
facilitate the societal integration of migrants through allowing them to naturalize without giving up 
their former nationality. Domestic citizenship policy may be expected to change in a more inclusive 
direction. Other examples, perhaps more generally of minority integration or migrant inclusion, are 
anti-discrimination policies such as the Commission's 1998 Action Plan Against Racism (CEC, 
1998), or the 2000 anti-discrimination directive.(5)  
4 The Case of the Netherlands   
In this paper I test these propositions on the Europeanization of domestic immigration policies 
against empirical evidence from the Netherlands. I focus on Dutch legislation as well as 
parliamentary debates in the 1990s and analyze how relevant European requirements found their way 
into domestic legislation in a more or less technical manner. I focus on the parliamentary discourse, 
and in particular on the 'domestic' and 'European' arguments brought into debates between 
government and parliament on the issues under scrutiny. My research methods consist of analyzing 
legislative texts and judicial rulings, both European and national, studying parliamentary 
proceedings, and interviewing key domestic actors.  
6
There are two reasons why parliamentary politics is at the center of my analysis. First, the actual 
output in terms of domestic public policy is explained most directly by looking at the parliamentary 
debate, in that it is, after all, the national parliament that has to approve new laws. Looking at the 
arguments used by national MPs in these debates allows me to measure the evidence for 
Europeanization against the evidence for alternative, domestic considerations. Second, I assume 
(perhaps naively) that the parliamentary debate is in a way a residual of societal debates, in that MPs 
have a clear electoral interest in voicing the concerns of their voters. Thus, by focusing on 
parliamentary politics I should be able to pin down domestic change and resilience in these specific 
issues, and also to infer conclusions for a wider national context.  
A final aspect of my research strategy that needs clarification is my case selection. I argue that the 
Netherlands is a most likely case for European integration to have an impact on domestic 
immigration policies, which makes it worthwhile bringing to the attention of more generalized 
discussions having in mind that Europeanization is still in its infancy in this policy field. This means 
that if European integration should be expected to impact on domestic free movement, asylum or 
citizenship policies, it should at least be visible in the Netherlands. And, conversely, should there be 
only limited Europeanization in the Netherlands, then it is not likely to be more substantial in many 
other countries. There are three reasons why the Netherlands can be considered a most likely case.  
First of all, being a small country with specific commercial and security interests, the Netherlands 
has always been highly involved in international affairs. It has been one of the original six founding 
countries of the European Coal and Steel Community, and Dutch governments have always been 
strong proponents of European integration (Soetendorp and Hanf, 1998: 36). Secondly, monism has 
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parliament do not need specific transformation to affect the rights of Dutch subjects, the 
constitutional setting in the Netherlands is optimal for Europeanization (Claes and De Witte, 1998: 
171; cf. Kellerman, 1990: 117). Thirdly, besides being generally receptive to external (European) 
influences, the Netherlands has often taken a positive (or even pro-active) attitude towards 
Europeanization in the field of immigration policy. This is particularly the case for asylum policy, 
where Dutch governments have consistently tried to push for more European integration. The 
Netherlands have also supported the change towards a more permissive attitude on multiple 
nationality in the Council of Europe, and pushed forward the agenda of equal treatment as part of the 
completion of the internal market.  
5 Negative Integration: Free Movement of Persons    
5.1 The European Free Movement Acquis  
The right for every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States is a core element of Union citizenship (Article 18 (ex 8a) EC Treaty). This provision was 
inserted in the EC Treaty in November 1993 after the Treaty of Maastricht had been ratified by all 
Member States, but must primarily be seen as a catalogue of already existing rights. Intra-EU 
migration has been liberalized for a long time already. Community workers have enjoyed a right to 
free movement since the 1960's (see Guild, 1999; Staples, 1999). Free movement of persons can 
only be fully understood by looking at the relevant secondary Community legislation in force, which 
has been virtually unchanged since 1993.  
The liberalized intra-EU migration regime goes back to the Treaty of Rome, but it was not before the 
adoption of Council Regulation 1612/68 that the freedom of movement for workers became firmly 
grounded in secondary Community law. According to this regulation:  
1. Any national of a Member State, shall, irrespective of his place of residence, have the right to 
take up an activity as an employed person, and to pursue such activity, within the territory of 
another Member State in accordance with the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action governing the employment of nationals of that State;  
2. He shall, in particular, have the right to take up available employment in the territory of 
another Member State with the same priority as nationals of that State (Article 1).  
7
One should note that, although this does not follow necessarily from the Treaty provisions, the 
workers' family was not forgotten. Workers have the right to be joined by their spouses and their 
descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants, as well as by dependent relatives in the 
ascending line, i.e. their parents (Article 10). With regard to domestic immigration control, Directive 
68/360 is of great importance as it sets out rules expressing the right of residence. Community 
workers and their family members shall be allowed to enter the territories of all Member States 
'simply on production of a valid identity card or passport' (Article 3(1)). Member States are 
forbidden to demand entry visa or equivalent documents save from family members who are not 
nationals of a Member State (Article 3(2)). This right of residence remains open to Community 
workers and their family members after the worker concerned has ceased working, or died. 
Limitations to the right of residence are only justified on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health (Directive 64/221).  
The European free movement acquis gradually became more inclusive over the years by extending 
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(Directive 75/34). After the battle against discriminatory national regulations was intensified with 
the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 the scope of the free movement acquis expanded. In 
1990 the Community broke with the tradition of protecting only economically actives, and granted a 
right of residence to all member state nationals and their dependants, provided that they are covered 
by a health insurance and have sufficient resources (Directive 90/364). In addition, pensioners and 
students were granted a similar right of residence (Directives 90/365 and 90/366). By virtue of the 
1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), which entered into force on 1 January 
1994, the free movement rights were moreover acknowledged in a similar way to nationals from the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This means that since 1994, the privileged category of 
'Community nationals' besides Union citizens also includes non-Union citizens from Iceland, 
Norway and (since 1 May 1995) Liechtenstein.(6)  
5.2 Dutch Compliance with Community Law   
The European free movement acquis was implemented by the Netherlands without much political 
ado. These revisions generally took place by means of a so-called 'Aliens Decision' (Royal Decision 
to implement the Aliens Act). On 15 July 1969, both Directive 68/360 on the abolition of restrictions 
on movement and residence and Directive 64/221 on the coordination of special measures relating to 
this, were implemented by way of the Aliens Decision. On the same date, by ministerial decree the 
so-called 'Aliens Regulation' was revised in order to lay down the specific details of these measures, 
such as the format of the temporary residence permit for Community workers. In this way, the right 
to free movement for Community workers and their families became a matter of practical relevance 
in the Netherlands. In similar fashion these rights were extended to providers of services and self-
employed workers in respectively 1974 and 1976. In 1992 a single Aliens Decision included 
economically inactive Member State nationals, pensioners, and students in these equal treatment 
provisions. Hence already before the formal coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty at 1 
November 1993, all Union citizens who were covered by a health insurance and had sufficient 
resources enjoyed the right to reside in the Netherlands.  
Due to the working of Community free movement provisions, the traditional subject of immigration 
law – the alien – was differentiated into Community nationals and third-country nationals. A down-
to-earth but nevertheless striking consequence of such a differentiation came to the fore in 1994, 
when the Dutch Aliens Regulation was revised in order to implement the provision of Community 
law that the costs of issuing a residence permit for Community nationals may not be higher than the 
costs for an identity card for nationals.(7) With the introduction at 1 January 1995 of an identity card 
for Dutch nationals (which was at NLG 35 significantly cheaper than the traditional passport of 
around NLG 100), Community nationals could be asked to pay only NLG 35 for their residence 
permit, while third-country nationals would have to continue paying the much higher amount of 
NLG 125 for the same document.  
8
The special status of EU/EEA-citizens would not be visible in the Aliens Act itself (the 1965 Act 
recognized only one category of aliens) before the so-called 'Linkage Act' [Koppelingswet] of 26 
March 1998. The Linkage Act was a clear manifestation of the evolving differential treatment of 
aliens due to European integration. This Act introduced the 'link-up principle' in Dutch immigration 
law in order to strengthen the link between the legal and, more importantly, illegal status of aliens on 
the one hand and social arrangements on the other. According to the motivation of the Act, the 
situation should be prevented where, by providing them with health insurance, education, etc., aliens 
who do not (yet) enjoy a legal status but nevertheless reside in the Netherlands are encouraged to 
continue their illegal residence, and may even appear to be lawfully present at Dutch territory.(8)
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the Netherlands. At the same time, realizing the potential severity of these measures, the drafters of 
the Act acknowledged that the Aliens Act must be clear with regard to the category of people subject 
to the link-up principle. Most notably, those who enjoy the right of residence on the basis of 
Community law need to be exempted unambiguously from the restrictive regime because, contrary 
to third-country nationals, even when EU/EEA-citizens cannot present a valid residence permit they 
cannot be excluded from social arrangements. Moreover they can only be removed from Dutch 
territory on exceptional grounds of public policy, public health or public safety, but not because they 
lack a residence permit. As a consequence, the Linkage Act added the concept of Community 
national (Gemeenschapsonderdaan) to Article 1 of the Aliens Act, including both Union citizens and 
EEA-nationals, as well as their family members on grounds as defined in the EC Treaty. Community 
nationals do not need a residence permit in order to reside lawfully in the Netherlands (Article 1b).
(9) This revision of the Aliens Act was implemented on 3 July 1998 by way of a modification of the 
Aliens Decision. Because it was now no longer appropriate to provide Community nationals with a 
traditional residence permit that explicitly permits aliens to reside in the Netherlands (a permission 
that Community nationals do not need), the right of residence for EU/EEA-citizens is evidenced 
since July 1998 either by a special residence document which is only declaratory by nature (the E-
document), or by a special residence annotation in their passport (the so-called 'sticker') which is 
valid for three months only.(10)  
The ECJ has often confirmed that a residence permit can only have a declaratory effect, also in cases 
against the Dutch government. 'The issue of such a permit does not create the rights guaranteed by 
Community law, and the lack of a permit cannot affect the exercise of those rights.'(11) A number of 
referrals for preliminary reference by the Dutch Study Finance Appeals Board underscore the 
accessibility of legal arenas in the Netherlands for Community nationals and, more importantly, a 
general willingness to invoke Community law in matters where the issue of equal treatment is at 
stake.  
6 Positive Integration: Asylum   
6.1 The European Asylum Acquis  
Perhaps somewhat similar to the field of environmental policy, where frontrunners or 'pace-setters' 
equally attempt to upload their national policies to the European level (Börzel, 2002), European 
asylum cooperation is driven only by a minority of countries (in particular Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands). The establishment of a Common European Asylum System, a goal formulated by the 
European Council at its Tampere summit in 1999, has always been less attractive to so-called 
'laggard countries' with traditionally less developed asylum systems. Also, because asylum policy is 
at the core of state sovereignty, delegating the authority to decide who is to be granted asylum, has 
been subject to serious reservations from 'EU-skeptic' countries such as Denmark and the U.K. 
throughout the 1990s (although the latter has become much more favorable towards a common 
European approach over the past few years). Precisely because of the underlying redistributive logic 
and national sentiments, harmonization of European asylum policies is a highly contentious example 
of positive integration. In fact, asylum policy is not yet a fully-fledged example of 'strong' positive 
integration, in the sense that cooperation under the unanimity rule of the Maastricht Treaty has 
remained limited to lowest common denominator policies. The need for 'strong' outcomes is high, 
however, because European regulation in this field is a sine qua non for the completion of the 
common market, as the contemporary practices of policy competition and recurring border controls 
illustrate (see also Wijsenbeek, Case C-378/97).  
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'Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one 
of the Member States of the European Communities' is sufficiently revealing with respect to the 
content of the agreement: one state, and only one, should be responsible for the application for 
asylum by one asylumseeker. Asylumseekers are expected to lodge their application for asylum in 
the first member state they enter, e.g. when an asylumseeker enters the European continent through 
Italy, and then travels northwards to lodge his application for asylum in the Netherlands, the Dutch 
government is entitled to claim that Italy has the responsibility for this asylumseeker. When it cannot 
be proven, however, that a person has traveled through another member state before lodging his 
application in a second member state (because travel documents are not available), the first member 
state with which the application for asylum is lodged is responsible for examining it.(12)  
European asylum cooperation was subsequently codified under the 1992 Treaty on European Union 
(TEU). Next to the EC framework, the TEU erected a so-called third pillar for all intergovernmental 
cooperation involving justice and home affairs (JHA). The most relevant instruments enacted under 
the third pillar on the issue of asylum are two 1992 Council resolutions, which were largely inspired 
by the German difficulties to cope with an ever growing stream of asylumseekers, and by now have 
seemingly found their way into most domestic asylum policies (Lavenex, 2001). These so-called 
'London Resolutions' argued that domestic 'asylum policies should give no encouragement to the 
misuse of asylum procedures,' and substantially redefined the idea of refugee protection. When 
asylum-seekers travel through safe third countries – transit countries where they could have claimed 
asylum – they are excluded from the asylum procedure altogether (Bunyan, 1997, no. 26). And, 
when asylumseekers originate from countries in which there is generally no serious risk of 
persecution – safe countries of origin – their applications are considered 'manifestly 
unfounded' (Bunyan, 1997, nos. 27 and 28).  
Anticipating the future, much depends on the question of how asylum policy develops under the 
'Immigration Title' of the EC Treaty, as instituted by the Amsterdam Treaty and refined by the Nice 
Treaty. At the moment only those measures relating to the list of third countries for short-term visas 
and the technical aspects of a uniform visa format are to be decided by the Council on the basis of 
qualified majority voting (QMV), with only a consultative role for the EP. As it stands now, with the 
Treaty of Nice not yet entered into force, the co-decision procedure of Art. 251 EC Treaty will only 
be applied in 2004 to measures establishing the procedures and conditions for issuing visas and the 
rules on a European visa. All provisions on asylum – from the reception of asylumseekers to a 
common temporary protection status – are decided by way of the co-decision procedure 'provided 
that the Council has previously adopted [acting unanimously] Community legislation defining the 
common rules and basic principles governing this issue' (Article 67(5), second indent EC Treaty, as 
inserted by the Treaty of Nice). At the moment, a directive on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection (2001/55/EC) is probably the most important recent development, and other 
directives (on procedures and reception) are being deliberated.(13)  
6.2 Dutch Institutional Adaptation   
The implementation of the Dublin Convention, the core instrument of European asylum policy, on 
the whole is a problematic issue (CEC, 2001). This is mostly due to the fact that only few 
asylumseekers carry valid identity cards (not more than 20 percent), which makes it very difficult to 
trace where they have entered the Dublin-area, or whether they have made previous applications in 
other countries. In an interview a Christian-Democratic MP (pro-Dublin) criticized the government 
because it would lay a Dublin-claim on only 4 percent of all applicants of which 'few would be 
granted.'(14) In another interview from the same period, however, a Green MP (anti-Dublin) 
criticized government policy for its harshness as there would be 'many Dublin-claims, of which more 
than 85 percent is granted.'(15) It may be clear that in this case the evaluation by the MPs of the 
effectiveness of the Dublin Convention depended strongly on their political backgrounds. In fact, 
both MPs were partly right. In the year 2000, the Netherlands made only 3408 Dublin-claims (on a 
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were granted. The Netherlands has been relatively successful in this respect, compared with other 
Dublin-countries. Yet, the fact that many successfully claimed applicants were still not handed over 
to other countries (mostly Germany) at the end of the year, underlines the generally accepted idea 
that the Dublin Convention is not very effective.(16)  
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The Netherlands also redefined its asylum policy in the mid-1990s by way of a 'Safe Countries of 
Origin Act' (1994) and a 'Safe Third Countries Act' (1995). Yet despite the fact that these policy 
changes clearly resonate the rationale from the two London Resolutions, the link between European 
and domestic policy is not straightforward here. In fact, after studying the explanatory notes and 
parliamentary proceedings from that period, it becomes clear that the Dutch (restrictive) policy shift 
was basically a reaction to similar changes in Germany, rather than the institutional adaptation to 
European policy. Both the Safe Countries of Origin Act and the Safe Third Countries Act explicitly, 
and almost exclusively, refer to the respective German terms of sichere Herkunftsstaaten and sichere 
Drittstaaten. This is surprising, first, given the fact that in general the Dutch attitude towards more 
European asylum cooperation has been very proactive. And, second, it is noteworthy to the extent 
that in the literature it is widely accepted that the London Resolutions, although not legally binding, 
have been very influential (cf. Lavenex, 2001; Joppke, 1998). For a better understanding of policy 
change in the Netherlands we need to look more closely at the domestic policy context.  
The Dutch asylum policy context is generally very favorable towards Europeanization. The 1998 
coalition agreement, for example, explicitly spelled out that 'the Netherlands will make a strong plea 
within the European Union for a good harmonization of European asylum and immigration 
policy' (Coalition Agreement, 1998). But also in 1994, and even as far back as in 1989, the coalition 
agreements – key political documents that formulate the general direction of government policy for 
the next four years – already mention the European dimension to Dutch asylum policy. And, more 
recently, the government again underlined that the new Aliens Act 'should be enacted in international 
context with a view to a harmonization in the near future (…) of European asylum and immigration 
policy.'(17)  
The Netherlands have always sought after a strong Europeanization of asylum policy, basically in 
order to achieve a more proportional distribution of asylumseekers in Europe.(18) The Dutch 
government, for example, explicitly views the recently adopted Eurodac Regulation, which should 
increase the effectiveness of the Dublin Convention by using fingerprints, but also the European 
Refugee Fund (which has only recently been put out to tender), as 'first steps towards a more 
proportional distribution of responsibility for asylumseekers within the European Union'.(19) 
Besides the government, the legislature in the Netherlands is also well aware of the opportunities 
offered by the EU. There is widespread consensus in viewing asylum as a European problem asking 
for a European solution. The main factions in Parliament, with the notable exception of the smaller 
Green Party, see a more equitable distribution of asylumseekers over EU member states (i.e. less 
asylumseekers in the Netherlands) as the important European opportunity.(20) Hence, the notion of 
'burden-sharing' is the crucial element of the European opportunity structure of Dutch asylum policy 
(cf. Vink and Meijerink, 2002).  
In the 1990s, the main receiving European states unilaterally implemented a number of deterrent 
measures in their asylum policies to reduce pressures on domestic asylum systems. With over four 
hundred thousand asylumseekers in 1992 alone, for example, Germany found itself faced with the 
necessity to water down the constitutionally safeguarded right (Joppke 1998, 129; see also Marshall 
2000, 87-96). The fact that the 1992 London Resolutions could be used to legitimize the 
constitutional amendment, which was necessary to limit its generous postwar policy, was a crucial 
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and 1994, in contrast with decreasing numbers in Germany, the number of asylumseekers in the 
Netherlands had increased significantly. Dutch MPs fearing 'asylum-tourism' explicitly demanded 
that Dutch policy would not deviate from German policy.(21) An explanatory note to the Safe Third 
Countries Act is rather unambiguous: 'The most important intention of the introduction of a 
regulation concerning safe third countries was to improve the connection with the German asylum 
policy, in order to end in this way the phenomenon of 'asylum-shopping' in the direction of the 
Netherlands.'(22)  
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7 Weak Integration: Citizenship (23)  
7.1 Weak Negative Integration: Union Citizenship  
'Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union,' stated the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Article 17(1) EC Treaty). The admission to Union citizenship, and hence 
the enjoyment of the rights associated with the status, depends crucially on domestic citizenship 
policies. After the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam the communis opinio has been that member 
states are not willing to give up their autonomy in matters of citizenship acquisition (Closa, 1995; 
D'Oliveira, 1999). As explained earlier, however, the fact that every national being a Union citizen 
enjoys the freedom to travel, work and live throughout the Union, is reason to presume some 
constraining impact a priori. The European Court of Justice can be an important independent agent 
in the enforcement of such indirect or weak negative integration.  
One of the rare test-cases for the Court's position towards the definition of member state nationality 
has been the case of Mario Vicente Micheletti and Others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria 
(C-369/90), in which the nationality question was not easy to side-step (cf. Hall, 1995: 57-60; 
O'Leary, 1996: 43-48).(24) The case involved a man, Micheletti, who possessed both Argentine and 
Italian nationalities. After arriving in Spain, he sought to rely in his capacity as an orthodontist on 
the freedom of establishment under the EC Treaty. He was refused a residence permit and the 
opportunity to exercise his profession by the Spanish authorities. They did not recognize his Italian 
nationality, and thus his legal status as a Union citizen, because in cases of dual nationality Spanish 
civil code takes account only of the last de facto residence, which in this case was Argentina. 
Following the Court's ruling, on the basis of Article 43 EC Treaty, Mr. Micheletti was entitled by 
virtue of his Italian nationality to be issued with a residence permit if he could show that he intended 
to establish himself in Spain. Hence the domestic (i.e. Italian) autonomy to decide who is a Member 
State national was confirmed by the Court, but not without adding that this 'competence must be 
exercised with due regard to Community law' (paragraph 10). Taking into account that, for example, 
the principle of supremacy of Community law was established in the Costa-case, but not applied to 
the case at hand,(25) it should be stressed that the consideration that domestic nationality law can 
violate Community law, in itself was a revolutionary challenge to national autonomy (De Groot, 
1998: 123-124; but see D'Oliveira, 1999: 403-412).  
7.2 Weak Positive Integration: European Citizenship Norms   
The 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations 
in Cases of Multiple Nationality (Strasbourg, 1963), ratified by thirteen European countries (all EU 
member states except for Finland and Greece), reflected the broadly accepted idea that nationality 
should be the recognition of a fundamental link between the individual and the political community, 
endowing the state with the duty to protect the interests of its citizens/nationals and the individual 
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medium to obtain access to the labor market and social security, whilst on the other hand military 
service was increasingly being abolished across Europe.  
In 1993 therefore the Second Protocol amending the 1963 Strasbourg Convention was signed and led 
to a fundamental change in the European attitude towards multiple nationality (it has been ratified 
only by France, Italy and The Netherlands). It became widely accepted that whereas multiple 
nationality is undesirable from the perspective of the state, from the perspective of the individual it 
might be crucial for his integration in society. This line was continued in the European Convention 
on Nationality (ECN) that was signed in Strasbourg on 6 November 1997. To this date it is ratified 
only by Austria, Moldova Slovakia and the Netherlands. With respect to multiple nationality the 
ECN is neutral; it neither obliges nor forbids signatory states to demand applicants for voluntary 
naturalization to give up their former nationality. In the Preamble, the ECN only notes 'the varied 
approach of States to the question of multiple nationality.' In comparison with the 1963 Convention, 
this 'neutrality' in practice implies a tolerant attitude to multiple nationality (Hall, 1999: 600).  
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7.3 Dutch Citizenship Policy   
A review of parliamentary proceedings and appendices in the Netherlands shows that the European 
Union is hardly ever spoken of in the context of citizenship policy. The acknowledgement by the 
Dutch government in January 1994 of the widespread sensitivity towards too much EU impact on 
national affairs exemplifies such a reserved attitude. The establishment of Union citizenship by the 
Maastricht Treaty had after all caused considerable political turmoil, and not only in Denmark. In a 
response to parliamentary questions, the government stipulated that 'clearly no initiatives [by the 
EU] are to be expected concerning nationality law' (LHDP-AP1993-1994, 23029 (9), p. 5).  
The controversial statement of the ECJ in the Micheletti-case, however, that domestic citizenship 
policy falls within the scope of Community law, paves the way for increased EU interference by 
weak negative integration. For example, the traditional rule that people lose their state's citizenship 
when they live abroad permanently, might obstruct Community law when Union citizens live in 
another member state, i.e. use their right to free movement. The Netherlands, to my knowledge an 
exception in the EU, therefore changed its legislation to comply with Community law in this regard. 
The Dutch case shows how negative integration can impact on domestic citizenship policy, 
marginally for now, but possibly more centrally in the future. The adjustment of Dutch citizenship 
policy with respect to the loss of citizenship, in order to prevent a possible violation of Community 
law, must be seen as an interesting case of limited Europeanization by weak negative integration.  
The constraints posed by the 1963 Strasbourg Convention and the 1993 Second Protocol are a 
central concern throughout the Dutch parliamentary debate in the 1990s. Since 1993 this European 
side of Dutch citizenship policy revolves around the question of whether the Second Protocol allows 
or even demands to abolish the rule of one nationality from the 1985 Dutch Nationality Act (Article 
9(1), sub b). Dutch citizenship policy in fact anticipated the Second Protocol by taking a permissive 
turn in 1992 with the toleration of multiple nationality. Despite the fact that the Second Protocol was 
ratified by the Netherlands in 1996, Dutch governments could never get enough parliamentary 
support to formalize this permissive policy. In November 1996 it became clear that the bill could not 
count on the support of the Christian-democrats (CDA) in the Senate. The Christian-democratic 
senators felt free to oppose the government bill as they were, and had always been, against the 
principle of multiple nationality. They also saw fundamental difficulties with the 1963 Strasbourg 
Convention. 'The government bill simply went too far,' said one MP.(26) Moreover, the Christian-
democrats had become much more skeptic about the process of integrating immigrants into Dutch 
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Proponents in parliament, in particular the Labour Party (PvdA), but also the Democrats (D66) and 
the Greens (Groen Links), relied heavily on the Second Protocol and the ECN, which were both 
clearly seen as a strategic opportunity to influence citizenship policy in a more permissive direction. 
Opponents, besides the Christian-democrats also the Liberal Party (VVD), pointed out that the 1963 
Strasbourg Convention was still in force and that the principle of one nationality should be respected. 
Due to this unresolved conflict between the 1963 Convention and the 1993 Second Protocol, there 
was a de facto autonomy for the national legislature. A 1993 government bill stranded in the Senate 
in 1997, which lead to the reintroduction of the principle of one nationality. The impact of the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality remains an open question, although in a note of October 1999 
the Dutch government explicates that ratifying the ECN would not oblige the Netherlands to change 
its citizenship policy substantively.(28)  
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European citizenship norms hence do not decisively direct Dutch citizenship policy one way or the 
other. Although in setting the terms of the parliamentary discourse the importance of norm-setting by 
the Council of Europe must not be underestimated (Checkel, 2001), the preferences of Dutch MPs 
regarding multiple nationality have remained stable throughout the 1990s. In 1998 a more modest 
reform bill was introduced by the government, which maintained the rule of one nationality but 
formalized a large part of the 1992-1997 permissive policy by allowing for some substantial 
exceptions. This new bill to reform the Nationality Act was adopted in March 2000 by the Lower 
House of Dutch parliament (without prior ratification of the ECN). The Senate adopted the 
Nationality Act (and ratified the ECN at the same day), with the support of coalition party VVD this 
time, but still without that of the CDA. With respect to the exceptions to the rule of one nationality, it
can be argued that the Council of Europe helped mobilizing support for domestic reform. 'The big 
European gain is the multitude of exceptions to the rule of one nationality,' admitted even the liberal-
conservatives who have always most consistently of all parties opposed the principle of multiple 
nationality.(29)  
8 Conclusion   
In this paper I have differentiated between four types of European integration and shown how these 
connect to domestic immigration policies. By presenting some empirical evidence from the case of 
the Netherlands, I have analyzed to what extent and in what way domestic free movement, asylum 
and citizenship policies are affected more substantively by European integration. Substantially, the 
logic of free movement of persons leads to a differential treatment of aliens, and we could see how 
Community nationals increasingly have become a privileged category of 'denizens'. In the cases of 
asylum and citizenship policy, we saw that, although European policies and norms were surely 
relevant, they could not decisively affect domestic politics. For the Netherlands, this can be 
explained by respectively the opportunity structure that is particularly focused on Germany for 
'burden-sharing' reasons, and by the fact that domestic support for dual nationality disappeared after 
the about-turn of the Christian-democrats.  
It is of course difficult to draw general conclusions on the basis of only one case. Yet in itself a case 
study, besides the empirical interest of in-depth description, allows for broader conclusions beyond 
the limited scope of the specific case under scrutiny (King et al, 1994: 43-46). First, I have argued 
here that for positive integration in the field of citizenship one must look not so much to Brussels, 
but rather to Strasbourg (cf. Checkel, 2001). Perhaps ironically, it is because the EU is perceived to 
be more powerful than the Council of Europe, and Brussels more distrusted than Strasbourg, that it 
offers less opportunities for reform. Secondly, in the field of asylum policy, it is often heard that 
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for bringing about lowest common denominator policies (Schuster, 2000: 120; Lavenex, 2001: 864). 
Yet, again, although a common trend towards toward more restrictive asylum policies can hardly be 
denied, at least from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s (Vink and Meijerink, 2002), the mechanism 
linking European with domestic policies is far from straightforward. At least in the Netherlands, 
evidence shows that many proactive efforts to bring about a common European policy, do not 
necessarily imply the subsequent Europeanization of domestic politics.  
Finally, critics might ask whether there is really that much difference between Europeanization 
caused by negative or positive integration. They might, for example, point at my case of asylum 
policy which is clearly not an example of fully-fledged strong positive integration, and argue that the 
difference between free movement and asylum policy (or citizenship policy, for that matter) points to 
the importance rather of binding vs. non-binding European policies. Here I would respond, however, 
that binding European policies are instituted more forcefully under pressure from negative 
integration, and that the case of asylum policy clearly shows the limits of positive integration. Also, 
the need to comply is stronger due to a greater leeway for such European institutions as the 
Commission and – especially – the European Court of Justice. The Micheletti-case and its domestic 
impact on Dutch citizenship policy moreover show how the negative integration of free movement of 
persons can even spill over to 'weaker' issue areas where nation states anxiously guard their national 
autonomy. The distinction between negative and positive integration provides a useful starting point 
to analyze why and how domestic immigration issues increasingly become subject (or not) to 
Europeanization.  
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